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Abstract: This article dives into the origins of the philosophy of science of Karl Popper. Where does Popper’s 
epistemological position take root around the two fundamental problems of the theory of science? This is the 
main question. This research brings to light really amazing results, some of which may lead to cast doubt on 
the soundness of the basic Popperian approaches. But it is no less surprising, if at all, that with so little Popper 
could get so much. Popper’s case is an excellent example of how some ideas that some might consider pinned 
up, can penetrate deeply if, besides being interesting, they are defended with conviction and intelligence and 
at least a part of the intellectual environment contributes to their discussion, assimilation and development.
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Resumen: En este artículo buceo en los orígenes de la filosofía de la ciencia de Popper. ¿Dónde se enraíza 
su posición epistemológica en torno a los dos problemas fundamentales de la teoría de la ciencia? Ésta es la 
pregunta principal. Esta investigación saca a la luz resultados realmente sorprendentes, algunos de los cua-
les pueden llevar a hacer dudar de la solidez de los planteamientos popperianos básicos. Pero no es menos 
sorprendente, llegado el caso, que con tan poco Popper pudiera llegar a conseguir tanto. El caso de Popper 
constituye un excelente ejemplo de cómo unas ideas, que alguno podría considerar prendidas con alfileres, 
pueden calar profundamente si, además de ser interesantes, se defienden con convicción e inteligencia, y al 
menos una parte del entorno intelectual contribuye a su discusión, asimilación y desarrollo.
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1. Introduction
In the XXI century the philosophy of science is an academic discipline fully consolidated in universities all over 
the world, with specialized professors, many of whom have dedicated to it their lives. We cannot therefore 
judge the contributions of the predecessors who inaugurated the discipline with the same criteria of rigor 
with which we evaluate almost daily to each other in our days. But tracking down their origins is a fascinating 
task. This always requires exquisite care, prudence, respect and, of course, professionalism. Surely this search 
can sometimes lead us to demystify, at least in part, the characters investigated; but in part, too, to recognize 
their achievements. Let me pick up here some lines from the French epistemologist Claude Bernard (1813-
1878). For Bernard (1957:41) the non-submission to authority “is by no means out of harmony with the re-
spect and admiration which we bear to the great men preceding us, to whom we owe the discoveries at the 
base of the sciences of to-day.”
The character I’m going to tackle in this article is the Viennese Karl Popper (1902-1994). Popper be-
gan stomping on the philosophical arena. In 1933 he had already concluded, and was close to publishing, a 
book entitled Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie (The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of 
Knowledge). Both fundamental problems of the philosophy of science were the problem of induction and the 
problem of demarcation. The choice of the title of the book was not casual, since both problems were the 
two central questions that were already being debated in the philosophical environment of that time, an 
environment that casually, but fortunately, was also mainly Viennese. The Vienna Circle and its philosophical 
surroundings were particularly interested in establishing a criterion of demarcation between science and 
metaphysics. And as Popper, by that time –late twenties and early thirties of the last century– already had a 
solution to both problems, he found a tilled ground, though certainly not propitious, to the proposal of their 
own approaches on the matter.
To investigate the roots of Popper’s philosophical thought is to first investigate his mentioned book, for 
his Logik der Forschung, hereafter LF, 1935, is an abbreviated version of it, not even written by Popper himself. 
This is an anecdote that still amazes many, but that Popper did not hide. He revealed it forty years later in 
his Intellectual Autobiography (Popper 1974a: 67). Nonetheless The Logic of Scientific Discovery, hereafter LSD, is 
Popper’s work, even if Popper was not who wrote it.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, and Rudolf Carnap’s The Logical Structure of the World (Der logische Aufbau 
der Welt, 1928) are the books that inaugurate the contemporary philosophy of science. Both are seminal, but 
in the present paper, I focus myself on the first one, which the history of scientific philosophical thought of 
the West has placed in the privileged place it deserves. Here I tackle the following issues:
 
1. What did Popper know about the philosophers around him?
2. What did Popper know about other European philosophers of science?
3. Where did Popper’s anti-inductivism come from?
4. Where did Popperian falsificationism come from?
5. What role did Popper play in the development of the theory of scientific explanation?
6. Was Popper in his early days a realist philosopher of science?
7. What is the origin of instrumentalism in the current philosophy of science?
To be completely honest, it is absolutely imperative to remember that it is not possible to make a 
point-by-point comparison between The Logic of Scientific Discovery and The Two Fundamental Problems. The 
reason is that this last book, edited by Troels Eggers Hansen, and published in 1979, is based on the available 
manuscripts of the years 1930-1933, and that, as Hansen himself says in his Editor’s PostScript, p.485 (German1: 
Nachwort, p. 441), of the two volumes of which the work was composed “Volume I: The Problem of  Induction 
appears to have been preserved in its entirety, whereas almost the whole manuscript of Volume II: The problem 
of Demarcation must be presumed lost. Of this volume, there exist a few fragments only and the drastically 
1 Hereafter, ‘German’ refers to Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie, 1979.
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abridged version published in 1934 under the title Logik der Forschung.” This would explain, among other 
things, why in Logik der Forschung there is a chapter, entitled “Observations on Quantum Mechanics”, number 
IX, about which there is practically nothing in the modern edition of The Two Fundamental Problems. But this 
circumstance, that half of the source work from which LF (LSD) comes is lost, forces us to be very prudent in 
our judgments on Popper’s LSD, and therefore on the origins of his philosophy of science. Now prudence is 
not at odds with rigor.
 
2. What did Popper know about the European philosophers of science?
2.1. From the contemporary German-speaking philosophers and scientists we would nowadays consider the most 
relevant, Popper mentions Einstein, as we shall see later. From Mach and Schlick the original sources are nat-
urally in German.
But neither Richard Avenarius (1843-1896), a German positivist of great influence in Carnap, and 
author, among others, of Kritik der reinen Erfahrung, Leipzig 1888-1890, nor Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932), 
author among other books of Grundriss der Naturphilosophie, 1908, are mentioned by Popper.
Hugo Dingler (1881-1954), a German philosopher of physics, is referred to in page 232 (German: 215), 
regarding his critic to the theory of the relativity. The most complete reference is given in p. 414 (German, p. 
375) in which he raises the point of view of Dingler that “we address reality with our theoretical questions, 
and ‘exhaust’ it with the help of our theories”. But it ‘s the editor, and not Popper himself, who relates both 
references respectively to Dingler’s works Physik und Hypothese, 1921, and Grundlinien einer Kritik und exakten 
Theorie der Wissenschaften insbesondere der Mathematischen, 1907. On p. 436 (German, p. 394) Popper men-
tions Dingler’s conventionalism as a resource for emerging from the collapse of the science of the turn of the 
century. The editor relates this reference to Dingler’s works Die Grundlagen der Physik: Synthetische Prinzipien 
der mathematischen Naturphilosophie, 1923, and Der Zusammenbruch der Wissenschaft und der Primat der Philos-
ophie, 1926.
 
2.2. French philosophers
In his “Reply to Medawar on Hypothesis and Imagination” Popper (1974b: 1030-1031) claims: “Medawar’s 
contribution made me read Claude Bernard’s Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine and I am im-
mensely grateful for this. … [Bernard] constantly faced the ever-repeated overthrow of theories on all levels 
of universality and importance.” And Popper recognizes: “Medawar’s contribution has made me see, to my 
surprise, how many of my ideas have been anticipated by others; for those ideas not only came to me with-
out my having read or heard about them, but in some cases were developed in conscious opposition to my 
elders and betters.” Scientific realism, falsificationism and critical attitude, the anticipatory role of hypotheses 
and theories, questions that would become defining characteristics of the Popperian philosophy of science, 
were advanced by Bernard, many decades before Popper had developed his own ideas. But even the role of 
the context of scientific discovery, linked to a non-naive conception of induction and the view that scientific 
activity always begins with problems, were also anticipated by Bernard.
Of course, when Bernard published in 1865 his An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine 
(Introduction à l’étude de la medicine experimentale) he was in top form: in the intellectual maturity of a man of 
science also turned to philosophical reflection. His philosophical ideas are not therefore pinned they are not a 
happy finding, let alone the result of ingenious occurrences. They are the ripe fruit of serene critical reflection 
based on scientific practice.
Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) is mentioned indeed by Popper, but without referring to a single work of 
this relevant scientist.
First reference, p. 193 (German, p.179): “But conventionalism (Poincaré) asserts than in defining a space-
time system of measurement, we only apparently proceed in this fashion.”
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Second reference, p. 195 (German, p.181): “This sums up the view of conventionalism. It was original-
ly developed (in a less radical fashion) by Poincaré. In Duhem’s work in particular, it becomes evident that 
conventionalism is actually purely deductivist.” And several times on Section 30: Conventionalist and empiricist 
interpretations, illustrated by the example of applied geometry, p. 223
In a further reference, on p. 397 (German, p.338) Popper insists again, but this time without mentioning 
Poincaré: “The conventionalist view might be characterized by the statement that a scientific theorist can never 
be put right by ‘experience’; only an experimenter can be put right by experience –even he, however, not about 
the truth of scientific statements but only about the practical-experimental success of theories.”
Also Pierre Duhem is mentioned on p. 195, as indicated above. And on p. 196 (German, p.182): “Duhem 
and Kraft are probably the most important defenders of the deductivist modes of thought in the modern 
theory of knowledge.” And on p. 282 too (German, 260), from the German translation of his Physical Theory of 
1906, in relation to the problem of scientific holism. He never mentions him again. But it certainly is interesting 
what Popper says about him, p. 260: “From considerations of this sort, it has been concluded (for example, by 
Duhem2) that there exists no actual falsification of natural laws. Only a theory taken as a whole can be rejected, 
which by no means implies that all contentions of the theory have been rejected. On the contrary, we should 
always be prepared for individual propositions or parts of a falsified theory to re-emerge later (or in a differ-
ent context). They cannot, that is to say, be regarded as definitely falsified.” It is striking that Popper assumes 
that the falsification procedure was a pre-existent methodological tool in the practice of science.
2.3. British philosophers and scientists
 
The mathematician William Kingdon Clifford (1845-1879) and the theoretical statistician Karl Pearson (1857-
1936) –both of them very interested in the philosophy of science– are ignored by Popper. Nor is William 
Whewell (1794-1866) ever mentioned by Popper. Only on p. XVIII, of the Introduction, 1978!, he qualifies 
him as a great opponent of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), in the evaluation of the inductive sciences.
John Herschel (1792-1871) is only mentioned once, at p. 22 (German, p.20), as the origin, together with 
Bacon, of Mill’s ideas. William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) is only mentioned once, in p. 8, where Popper rejects 
Jevons’s alleged view that the scientific method would be a link of induction and deduction. And Arthur Stanley 
Eddington (1882-1944) is also mentioned only once by a German translation (p. 414, note 1 (German, p. 375, 
note 2)). Did any other more honourable reference appear in the missing volume of The Two Fundamental 
Problems to this British astrophysicist, who in 1919 contributed to the confirmation of the general theory of 
relativity? Of course, Eddington would have deserved it. But that, it seems, we will never know.
The great name of the theoretical statistics of the early twentieth century, Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher 
(1890-1962), for whom the theoretical statistics was the inductive logic par excellence, is completely ig-
nored by Popper. Only years later, as recorded in the new appendix * IV. The Formal Theory of Probability of 
LSD makes use Popper (1959: 330) of Fisher’s Likelihood concept (L.F., p. 272), but erroneously, since for Fisher 
precisely likelihood is not a probability, and also in * IX. Corroboration, the Weight of Evidence, and Statistical Tests, 
from 1954, 1957 and 1958 published in B.J.P.S., where he again refers to Fisher’s concept in p. 387, as well as 
in notes * 1 of p. 398 and * 5 of p 414 (p. 340 and notes *1 of p. 350 and *5 of p. 367 respectively of LF) The 
mistaken interpretation of the Fisherian concept of likelihood is also observed in footnote 8 at p. 243, as well 
as in p. 252 of the PostScript Vol. 1.
But the most astounding thing about this whole affair is that Walter Schiff, the carnal uncle of Popper, 
who wrote the final version of LSD, was professor of statistics3 at the University of Vienna! How did he not 
bring his nephew abreast of the developments in Ronald Fisher’s inductive statistical theory? Fisher’s first 
major contribution to theoretical statistics: “On the mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics” goes 
2 [Pierre Duhem, Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien (German von Friedrich Adler, 1908), pp. 243 ff., 266 f.]
3 Cf. Popper (1974a: 65)
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back to 1922. And between this date and 1935 Fisher published a significant number of articles on statistical 
estimation, inverse probability, fiducial probability and mathematical likelihood.
The inductive character of theoretical statistics was fundamental for Fisher (1922: 366), who indeed 
maintained that “the purpose of the statistical reduction of data is to obtain statistics4 which shall contain, as 
much as possible, ideally the whole, of the relevant information contained in the sample.” More clearly Fisher 
(1932: 257) recognized that “in inductive reasoning we attempt to argue from the particular, which is typically 
a body of observational material, to the general, which is typically a theory applicable to future experience. 
In statistical language we attempt to argue from the sample to the population from which it was drawn.” And 
in (1935:39) Fisher assumed that in inductive processes we attempt “to draw inferences from the particular 
to the general; or, as we more usually say in statistics, from the sample to the population. Such inferences 
we recognize to be uncertain inferences, but it does not follow from this that they are not mathematically 
rigorous inferences.” And whereas there is no guarantee for Fisher (1935: 40) of the adequacy of probability 
“for reasoning of a genuinely inductive kind”, “a mathematical quantity of a different kind, which I have termed 
mathematical likelihood, appears to take its place as a measure of rational belief when we are reasoning from 
the sample to the population.”5 Being Popper a convinced and confessed anti-inductivist theorist it is amazing 
that he never paid attention to the anti-Bayesian theoretical statistics, and in particular to his contemporary 
Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher.
3. Where did Popper’s anti-inductivism come from?
In The Two Fundamental Problems, p. 316, (German: 288), Popper puts forward what he calls the fundamental the-
sis of inductivism: “All legitimate statements of science must be reducible to elementary empirical statements. 
In other words: the truth of all legitimate statements must depend on the truth values of some elementary 
empirical statements.” Of course, for Popper it immediately follows that “As long as induction, or the inference 
of universal statements from singular experiences, is accepted as justified, the ‘fundamental thesis of inductiv-
ism’ proves to be an exceedingly useful demarcation criterion with the help of which natural laws can also be 
demonstrated to be ‘legitimate’.”
Nonetheless, according to him (The Two Fundamental Problems, p. 357. German, p. 325)): “The problem of 
induction, the question of the truth of universal empirical statements, is answered as follows: universal empir-
ical statements can never have a [definitive] positive truth value, but only a [definitive] negative truth value.”. 
And in LSD §6: Falsifiability as a Criterion of Demarcation, p. 40, Popper claims: “Now in my view there is no such 
thing as induction. Thus inference to theories, from singular statements which are ‘verified by experience’ 
(whatever that may mean), is logically inadmissible. Theories are, therefore, never empirically verifiable.”6
Considerably more evolved is Claude Bernard’s position, seventy years earlier, who devotes Section V of 
Chapter II of his 1957 book to induction and deduction in experimental reasoning. Understanding induction 
“as the process of moving from the particular to the general, while deduction is the reverse process moving 
from the general to the particular”, Bernard (1957: 45) claims that “Both forms of reasoning, investigating 
(inductive) and demonstrating (deductive), pertain to all possible sciences, because in all the sciences there 
are things that we do not know and other things that we known or think to know.” “The principles or the-
ories which serve as foundations for a science, whatever it may be, have not fallen from the sky; they were 
necessarily reached by investigation, inductive or interrogative reasoning, as we may choose to call it.” (45) 
4 For instance, the calculation of the sample statistics from the data of the population’s unknown mean values and the standard 
deviation. These statistics have to fulfil the requirements of consistency, efficiency and sufficiency.
5 In Rivadulla (1991a, Chap. IV and V and in 1991b) I have tackled extensively the problem of induction from the point of view of 
theoretical statistics, both historically and systematically.
6 And in the Addendum, 1972, Popper (LSD 1959, 2002: 281), affirms: “We can never rationally justify a theory, that is to say, our belief in 
the truth of a theory, or in its being probably true.” A position that he ratifies in his Intellectual Autobiography, where Popper (1974a: 
118) maintains that: “induction is a myth. No ‘inductive logic’ exists. And although there exists a ‘logical’ interpretation of the prob-
ability calculus, there is no good reason to assume that this ‘generalized logic’ (as it may be called) is a system of ‘inductive logic’.”
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According to Bernard (47): “induction and deduction belong to all the sciences. I do not believe that induction 
and deduction are really two forms of reasoning essentially distinct.” The reason, as Bernard (1957: 46) points 
out, is that “the general proposition which he [the naturalist] has reached, or the principle on which he relies, 
is relative and provisional, because it embodies complex relations which he is never sure that he can know. 
Hence, his principle is uncertain,…and so he must necessarily appeal to experiment to verify the conclusion 
of this deductive reasoning.” Or as he says later (page 48): “our principle must always remain provisional, 
because we are never certain that it includes only the facts and conditions of which we are aware. In short, 
our deductions are always hypothetical until verified experimentally.” That is, inductive inferences have to pass 
empirical control.
Being an inductivist scientist does not necessarily entail being naive or radical: “When any sort of phe-
nomenon strikes us in nature –claims Bernard (1957:48) in a way that reminds us of Peirce– we work out our 
idea of the cause determining it.” Bernard’s theory of induction maintains indeed suggestive relations with the 
Peircean idea of abduction, and thus provides a claim to the context of scientific discovery, unhappily rejected 
both by Popper and Reichenbach, which produced a considerable delay in the further development of the 
philosophy of science.
Bernard also anticipates to Popper in the idea that the empirical science should not be merely obser-
vational, but must be guided by theory: “It is impossible to devise and experiment without a preconceived 
idea; devising an experiment,…, is putting a question; we never conceive a question without an idea which 
invites an answer.” (p. 23) This idea he had already presented a few lines before: “An experimenter,…, is a man 
inspired by a more or less probable but anticipated interpretation of observed phenomena, to devise exper-
iments which, in the logical order of his anticipation, shall bring results serving as controls for his hypothesis 
or preconceived idea.” (22) Being anticipations of observations, hypotheses, conjectures or scientific theories 
are, for Bernard, subject to experimental control.
In relation to the view of the scientist’s anticipatory work we can see in Bernard an advance of the 
idea of abduction as a way of reasoning for the proposal and explanation of new hypotheses: “[Scientists] 
formulate more or less ingenious and more or less probable hypotheses based on these observations” (p. 
25), or: “Men who experiment, despite all their dexterity, cannot solve problems unless they are inspired by 
a fortunate hypothesis based on accurate and well-made observations.” (25-26) The hypotheses suggested as 
explanations of facts have to be submitted, however, to subsequent experimental control: “The true scientist 
is one whose work includes both experimental theory and experimental practice. (1) He notes a fact; (2) à 
propos of this fact, an idea is born in his mind; (3) in the light of this idea, he reasons, devises an experiment, 
imagines and brings to pass its material conditions; (4) from this experiment, new phenomena result which 
must be observed, and so on and so forth.” (p. 24) Or: the experimenter: “states an idea as a question, as an 
interpretative, more or less probable anticipation of nature, from which he logically deduces consequences 
which, moment by moment, he confronts with reality by means of experiment. He advances, thus, from partial 
to more general truths, but without ever daring to assert that he has grasped the absolute truth.” (p. 27) It is 
not, therefore, by means of a simple and naive enumerative induction that the scientist advances, anticipates 
or postulates new ideas.
There is no choice but to consider that Bernard is anticipating this way of reasoning which Peirce later 
called abduction. And as Bernard (1957: 33) goes deeper ahead: “À propos of a given observation, no rules can 
be given for bringing to birth in the brain a correct and fertile idea that may be a sort of intuitive anticipation 
of successful research. …its appearance is wholly spontaneous, and its nature is wholly individual.” Unlike 
Popper, the context of discovery is indeed relevant to the methodology of the science of the French physi-
cian. Clearer cannot express it Bernard in the following sentence: “Discovery, then, is a new idea emerging 
in connection with a fact found by chance or otherwise. Consequently, there can be no method for making 
discoveries.” (p. 35) “when one calls a new fact a discovery, the fact itself is not the discovery, but rather the 
new idea derived from it.” (53) But, as we said at the beginning, Bernard was a complete stranger to Popper.
In relation to the problem of induction we are still more astonished that Popper only refers to Bacon 
and Mill. Moreover, these references are not only indirect –Popper does not cite them directly– but they are 
also completely erroneous, for instance as he reproaches Mill that he makes no concession to the deduc-
tive method, for in Mill the deductive method is precisely the key to understanding the role of the inductive 
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method and at some point Mill even suggests the methodological importance of the modus tollens, although 
without explicitly mentioning it.
It is very strange indeed that Popper never mentions any work of Bacon, in particular, he never men-
tions the Novum Organum. And the same thing happens with Mill, of whom Popper never mentions his 
System of Logic. In his Intellectual Autobiography Popper attributes to Bacon a naive inductivism and reproaches 
him to adhere to an inductivism of collection of observations (Popper 1974a: 62). Amazingly, Bacon (1620: 
First Book, 105) himself claims precisely that induction by simple enumeration of cases is a childish affair: “The 
induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is puerile, leads to uncertain conclusions, and is exposed to 
danger from one contradictory instance, deciding generally from too small a number of facts, and those only 
the most obvious.”
Popper attacks Francis Bacon in The Two Fundamental Problems, pp. 45-46 (German, p. 42): “Naive inductiv-
ism –prior to Hume– readily affirms the existente of universal empirical statements. Bacon believes in inductio 
vera, a scientific method that in principle is capable of establishing, through systematic generalization, true and 
universally valid laws (…) This is the position against which Hume’s arguments are actually directed. It seems 
to me that this position has been finally overcome by Hume (in spite of Mill) and will not, therefore, be treated 
any further in this analysis.” The reproach of naive inductivism, attributed to Bacon, reappears again in The Two 
Fundamental Problems p. 286 (German, p. 264): “The interpretation attempted in the present section (the ‘naive’ 
interpretation of pseudo-statements) corresponds to naive inductivism (Bacon): this attempt is also defeated by 
an infinite regression. And the attempt to avoid this regression leads (…) to an apriorist solution.”
Popper’s position is unwise. He fails to consider the differences between the inductivist approaches of 
Aristotle and Bacon. Incidentally, the proper name Aristotle appears mentioned in The Two Fundamental Prob-
lems only on a single occasion, throughout the book. Indeed in p. 22 (German, page 20) we read: “classical logic 
is purely deductivist; inductivist reasoning has placed a very minor part (in spite of various attempts going 
back to Aristotle and perhaps to the Socratic method).”
Bacon and Mill are mentioned together in Chapter XII, Conclusion, of The Two Fundamental Problems, 
where on p. 355 (German, page 323), we read: “The theory of induction of Bacon (and Mill): Induction in an 
epistemological sense is rejected: there is no inductive rational method.” By the way, in The Two Fundamental 
Problems, Table II, p. 366 (German, p. 332), in which he presents the relationships between different positions in 
the theory of knowledge, Sir Karl again places Bacon and Mill together as representatives of a naive inductivism, 
whose thesis would be: “There is empirical verification of natural laws.”
However, in The Two Fundamental Problems, p. 315 (German, p. 288) Popper claims that “Bacon confused 
theory formation with metaphysics: by appealing to the evidence of the senses, he refused to give up his ge-
ocentric convictions.” Indeed, as I point out in Rivadulla (2003: 40-41), Bacon (1620, Second Book II, p. 178) 
refuses to recognize the Earth’s rotating movement: “[Galileo] has, however, imagined this data which can not 
be conceded (namely, the earth’s motion)”, and this raises the suspicion that Popper would know more about 
Bacon than what he hints.
As far as Stuart Mill is concerned, the following quotation gives us an idea of Popper’s image of Mill: 
“Theories of Knowledge may have either a deductivist or an inductivist orientation, depending on how they as-
sess the significance of deduction (logical derivation) and of induction (generalisation) (…) Radical inductivist 
positions (such as Mill’s) deny that deduction has any significance at all; for, it is argued, what can be deduced is 
only that which induction has originally placed in the major premises. But even intermediate positions (such 
as that of Jevons), which seeks to characterise the empirical-scientific method as a synthesis of induction and 
deduction, will be rejected here as ‘inductivist’. The deductivist view advocated here denies that induction has 
any significance.” (Popper, The Two Fundamental Problems: 8. German, 7-8.My emphasis, A.R.) (He practically 
literally returns to these ideas on p. 469 (German, 425)). Popper perseveres in this position on Mill in The 
Two Fundamental Problems, p. 22 (German, p. 20): “Notwithstanding Mill, who further developed Bacon’s and 
Herschel’s approaches, attempts to develop a logic of induction have not succeeded in dislodging the theory of 
deduction from its dominant position in logic.”
Popper mentions Mill also in the 1958 Preface of the English edition of LSD, and in note 3, p. 36, in an 
inconsequential reference. He also treats Mill in * IX, 1958, A Third Note on Degree of Corroboration or Confirma-
tion, where he also refers to Whewell, twenty-five years after the publication of L.F.
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4. Where did the Popperian falsificationism come from?
Clearly it comes from Einstein, as Popper (1974a: 29) points out in his Intellectual Autobiography: “what im-
pressed me most was Einstein’s own clear statement that he would regard his theory as untenable if it should 
fail in certain tests. Thus he wrote, for example: ‘If the redshift of spectral lines due to the gravitational po-
tential should not exist, then the general theory of relativity will be untenable.’”7 And Popper (1974a: ibid.) 
continues: “Einstein was looking for crucial experiments whose agreement with his predictions would by no 
means establish his theory; while a disagreement, as he was the first to stress, would show his theory to be 
untenable.
This, I felt, was the true scientific attitude. It was utterly different from the dogmatic attitude which 
constantly claimed to find ‘verifications’ for its favourite theories.”
The origins of Popperian fallibilism are linked to this recognition: “At that time I read through Einstein’s 
writings ... What I did find was his paper Geometrie und Erfahrung, in which he wrote8:
‘In so far as the statements of mathematics speak about reality, they are not certain, and in so far as they are certain, they 
do not speak about reality.’
At first, I generalized from mathematics to science in general9:
‘In so far as scientific statements speak about reality, they are not certain, and in so far as they are certain, they do not 
speak about reality.’
(…)
This idea of uncertainty or of the fallibility of all human theories, even of the best-corroborated ones, I later called 
‘fallibilism’. (To the best of my knowledge, Charles Sanders Peirce was the first who used this term.)” (Popper, The Two 
Fundamental Problems, XXV. German: XX-XXI)
Indeed in The Two Fundamental Problems, p.10 (German, p. 10) Popper already affirmed: “Einstein’s state-
ment that ‘In so far as the statements of mathematics speak about reality, they are not certain, and in so far as 
they are certain, they do not speak about reality’ may be generalized (if we replace ‘not certain’ by ‘falsifiable’ 
or ‘refutable’) into the following definition of empirical science: in so far as scientific statements speak about 
reality, they must be falsifiable, and in so far as they are not falsifiable, they do not speak about reality.” This 
lead Popper (1959: 86) to propose following definition in §21: Logical Investigation of Falsifiability: “A theory is to 
be called ‘empirical’ or ‘falsifiable’ if it divides the class of all possible basic statements unambiguously into the 
following two non-empty subclasses. First, the class of all those basic statements with which it is inconsistent 
(or which it rules out, or prohibits): we call this the class of the potential falsifiers of the theory; and secondly, 
the class of those basic statements which it does not contradict (or which it ‘permits’). We can put this more 
briefly by saying: a theory is falsifiable if the class of its potential falsifiers is not empty.” With this basic con-
ception Popper (1966: 260) could maintain that: “the method of science is rather to look out for facts which 
may refute the theory. This is what we call testing a theory –to see whether we cannot find a flaw in it.”
But if Popper had read John Herschel, he would have found that although Herschel argued that knowl-
edge of the near causes of phenomena takes place inductively, he (1830: 172) also held that “our next business 
is to examine deliberately and seriatim all the cases we have collected of its occurrence, in order to satisfy 
ourselves that they are explicable by our cause.” A methodological compromise that Herschel reiterates in 
(1830: 176.My emphasis): “our next step in the verification of an induction must therefore consist in extending 
its application to cases not originally contemplated: in studiously varying the circumstances under which our 
causes act, with a view to ascertain whether their effect is general; and in pushing the application of our laws 
to extreme cases.” Herschel’s inductivism is not, of course, naive, radical or dogmatic: “it is very important to 
observe, that the successful process of scientific inquiry demands continually the alternate use of both the 
inductive and deductive method.” (Herschel 1830: 184) In fact, Herschel insists (1830: 189) that “the inductive 
7 See Albert Einstein (1920, p. 132). German first edition: Über die spezielle und die allgemeine Relativitätsheorie. Brauchschweig: Vieweg, 
1917. But also Einstein (1920: 43, 75 and 104) gives indications of the need to subject theory to the control of experience.
8 [Albert Einstein, “Geometrie und Erfahrung” 1921, pp. 3 f.]
9 [Karl Popper, “Ein Kriterium des empirischen Charakters theoretischer Systeme”, Erkenntnis 3 (1933), p. 427.]
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and deductive methods of enquiry may be said to go hand in hand, the one verifying the conclusions deduced 
by the other; and the combination of experiment and theory, which may thus be brought to bear in such cases, 
forms and engine of discovery infinitely more powerful than either taken separately.”
Herschel (1830: 187) makes also use of the term empirical law. From these empirical laws he states 
that they are “unverified inductions, and are to be received and reasoned on with the outmost reserve …; 
and frequently, when afterwards verified theoretically by a deductive process, turn out to be rigorous laws 
of nature.”
But Herschel (1830: 218.My emphasis, A.R.) even advances the notion of a crucial experiment10 in situ-
ations of contrasting theories. In fact, he maintains that “When two theories run parallel to each other, and 
each explains a great many facts in common with the other, any experiment which affords a crucial instance to 
decide between them, or by which one or other must fall, is of great importance.” That is, a hundred years before 
Popper, the foundations of the critical methodology of science were already being taken up in the Western 
philosophy of science.
However, the demand for falsifiability or refutability in the methodology of science is present in the West-
ern philosophy still long before Herschel. In the Middle Ages the founder of the Franciscan School of Oxford, 
Robert Grosseteste (1168-1253), already advocated the falsification, via modus tollens, of hypotheses involving 
false consequences, in order to eliminate the maximum possible competing hypotheses. Following A. C. Crom-
bie, John Losee (1980: 36-37) presents an application of the modus tollens argument which led Grosseteste to 
falsify the hypothesis that the sun generates heat by conduction. In the contemporary historiography there is a 
debate about whether experimentalism in the modern sense was already introduced by Grosseteste, but what is 
indubitable is that already in the thirteenth century Robert Grosseteste was in favour of the methodological ad-
vantages of falsificationism, and in general of the emergency of experimental science. For instance, McEvoy (1982: 
207) asserts that “[Grosseteste] applied his theoretical principles of methodology to geometrical optics, using 
experiment and observation to verify or falsify his hypotheses.” Grosseteste was certainly an inductivist: “the 
universal can only be arrived at by way of induction.” But, as a good Aristotelian, he argued that the role of de-
monstrative reasoning is essential to science as well: “The absence of the universal in the understanding removes 
the possibility of demonstration, which can only begin from universals; and if there can be no demonstration, it 
follows that there can be no scientific knowledge.”11
Centuries later, in the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant (1781: 669) also rejected the possibility of in-
ferring or demonstrating the truth of a hypothesis from the knowledge of its consequences; on the contrary 
by means of modus tollens “if even only a single false consequence can be derived from a proposition, then this 
proposition is false.”
But if Popper had also known Claude Bernard he would have had to resign himself to the evidence that 
the nineteenth-century French epistemologist clearly anticipated his falsificationist methodology of science. In-
deed Bernard (1957: 23.My emphasis, A. R.) claimed: “[the experimenter] must submit his idea to nature and be 
ready to abandon, to alter or to supplant it, in accordance with what he learns from observing the phenomena 
which he has induced.” And on p. 32 he reiterates this same idea: “[the experimenter] makes suppositions 
about the cause of actions taking place before his eyes; and to learn whether the hypothesis which serves as 
groundwork for his interpretation is correct, he takes measures to make facts appear which in the realm of 
logic may be either the confirmation or the negation of the idea which he has conceived.”
Bernard anticipates what Popper would say many decades later, especially he advances the idea, which 
will also advance Einstein, that we must be willing to rule out our theories, if nature denies them. That is, our 
theories must be falsifiable, and the scientific method must be that of conjectures and refutations. Confidence 
in the principles of science does not prevent scientists “from testing and verifying them by direct observa-
tion.” (Bernard 1957: 36) In fact: “it is better to know nothing than to keep in mind fixed ideas based on the-
ories whose confirmation we constantly seek, neglecting meanwhile everything that fails to agree with them.” 
(p. 37) “we must never make experiments to confirm our ideas, but simply to control them; which means, in 
10 Which, as we shall see, also advances Claude Bernard.
11 Grosseteste quoted by McEvoy (1982: 330) from Gilson.
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other terms, that one must accept the results of experiments as they come, with all their unexpectedness and 
irregularity.” (p. 38) “The theories which embody our scientific ideas as a whole are, of course, indispensable 
as representations of science. … But as these theories and ideas are by no means immutable truth, one must 
always be ready to abandon them, to alter them or to exchange them as soon as they cease to represent the 
truth.” (p. 39.My emphasis, A. R.) “when we have put forward an idea or a theory in science, our object must 
not be to preserve it by seeking everything that may support it and setting aside everything that may weak-
en it. On the contrary, we ought to examine with the greatest care the facts which apparently would overthrow it, 
because real progress always consists in exchanging an old theory which includes fewer facts for a new one 
which includes more.” (Bernard 1957: 40-41.My emphasis, A.R.)
 The reason for Bernard’s fallibilist and falsificationist methodology of science lies in the conviction that 
“All the theories which serve as starting points … are true only until facts are discovered which they do not 
include, or which contradict them. When these contradictory facts are shown to be firmly established,…, ex-
perimenters … hasten … to modify their theory, because they know that this is the only way to go forward 
and to make progress in science.” (49-50) For this reason, “When experiment disproves his preconceived idea, 
the experimenter must discard or modify it. But even when experiment fully proves his preconceived idea, the 
experimenter must still doubt; for since he is dealing with an unconscious truth, his reason still demands a 
counterproof.” (52.My emphasis, A.R.)12 And Bernard focuses on counterproof in section VIII of ch. II: “Coun-
terproof decides whether the relation of cause to effect, which we seek in phenomena, has been found. To do 
this, it removes the accepted cause, to see if the effect persists, relying on that old and absolutely true adage: 
sublata causa, tollitur effectus. This is what we still call the experimentum crucis.” (55-56) Even the expression 
experimentum crucis is advanced by Bernard! “Indeed, proof, in science, never establishes certainty without 
counterproof. …experimental counterproof constitutes the scientific feeling par excellence.” (p. 56)
Popper is naturally forgiven of his ignorance of this epistemological precedent, since he was unaware 
of the existence of Claude Bernard. But what is truly astonishing is that Popper was unaware that Stuart Mill 
himself –of whom Popper (1974a: 93) recognizes in his Intellectual Autobiography that he had already anticipat-
ed the concept of causal or deductive explanation, a concept Popper himself would also advance, more than 
twenty years before Hempel, in his Logik der Forschung, 1934, § 12– had also been ahead of him in the require-
ment of the deductive hypothesis testing. In his reflections on the Deductive Method in Book III, Chapter XI, 
Of the Deductive Method, Mill (1843: 304) claims that “To the Deductive Method, thus characterised in its three 
constituent parts, Induction, Ratiocination, and Verification, the human mind is indebted for its most conspic-
uous triumphs in the investigation of nature.”
For Mill (1843:303-304) induction is subordinated to deduction: “If direct observation and collation of 
instances have furnished us with any empirical laws of the effect,… the most effectual verification of which 
the theory could be susceptible would be, that it led deductively to those empirical laws.” And: “To warrant 
reliance on the general conclusions arrived at by deduction, these conclusions must be found, on careful com-
parison, to accord with the results or direct observation wherever it can be had. If, when we have experience 
to compare with them, this experience confirms them, we may safely trust to them in other cases of which 
our specific experience is yet to come. But if our deductions have led to the conclusion that from a particular 
combination of causes a given effect would result, then in all known cases where that combination can be 
shown to have existed, and where the effect has not followed, we must be able to show (…) what frustrated it: if 
we cannot, the theory is imperfect, and not yet to be relied upon.” (Op.cit: 303-304.My emphasis, A.R.). This clearly 
shows the commitment of Mill with the scientific methodology of the deductive test of hypotheses, ahead of 
Popper in about a hundred years.
But even William Whewell (1794-1866) was himself committed almost hundred years before Popper 
with the idea of falsifiability of the proposed hypotheses: “What is requisite is, that the hypothesis should be 
close to the facts, and not connected with them by other arbitrary and untried facts; and that the philosopher 
should be ready to resign it as soon as the facts refuse to confirm it.” (Part Two, Book XII, Chapter XIII, pp. 276-
12 González Recio (2004) also acknowledges the anticipation by Claude Bernard of falsificationism in the methodology of science.
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277) 13 This idea is justified later, when Whewell (Part Two, Book XII, Chapter XIII, p. 287.My emphasis, A.R.) 
states that “when the validity of the opinion adopted by us has been repeatedly confirmed by its sufficiency 
in unforeseen cases, so that all doubt is removed and forgotten, the theoretical cause takes its place among 
the realities of the world, and becomes a true cause.” And immediately adds Whewell: “Newton’s Rule then, 
to avoid mistakes, might be thus expressed; that ‘we may, provisorily, assume such hypothetical cause as will 
account for any given class of natural phenomena; but that when two different classes of facts lead us to the 
same hypothesis, we may hold it to be a true cause.’ And this Rule will rarely or never mislead us. There are 
no instances, in which a doctrine recommended in this manner has afterwards been discovered to be false.” 
(Part Two, Book XII, Chapter XIII, p. 2876)14
Continuing with the British tradition, which he obviously belongs to, the logician, economist and philos-
opher of science Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) also considers that the deductive test of hypotheses is essentially 
part of the inductive methodology of science. This is firmly expressed by Jevons (1873: 525): “Inductive inves-
tigation … consists in the union of hypothesis and experiment, deductive reasoning being the link by which 
experimental results are made to confirm or confute the hypotheses.”
But if there is a philosopher of science who, like those already mentioned, not only anticipates Popper in 
the idea of the testability of hypotheses but also in the modernity of the problematic around their empirical 
falsification, that is the French physicist, historian and philosopher of science Pierre Duhem (1861-1916). Now, 
Duhem (1954: 168. French15, 1906: 274) maintains a holistic position on physics: “A physical law is a symbolic 
relation whose application to concrete reality requires that a whole group of laws be known and accepted.” 
That is why, in Part II, Chapter VI, ‘Physical theory and Experiment’, Duhem labels §II as follows: An experiment 
in physics can never condemn an isolated hypothesis but only a whole theoretical group. The falsificationist 
methodology is more than evident in Duhem (1954: 184. French, 1906: 302) when trying to test a theory: “A 
physicist disputes a certain law; he calls into doubt a certain theoretical point. How will he justify these doubts? 
How will he demonstrate the inaccuracy of the law? From the proposition under indictment he will derive the 
prediction of an experimental fact; he will bring into existence the conditions under which this fact should be 
produced; if the predicted fact is not produced, the proposition which served as the basis of the prediction 
will be irremediably condemned.” Now, the procedure is much more complex than it may seem in the light 
of these words, for as Duhem immediately points out (1954:185. French, 1906:303-304), “A physicist decides 
to demonstrate the inaccuracy of a proposition; in order to deduce from this proposition the prediction of 
a phenomenon, …, he does not confine himself to making use of the proposition in question; he makes use 
also of a whole group of theories accepted by him and beyond dispute. The prediction of the phenomenon, 
whose nonproduction is to cut off the debate, does note derive from the proposition challenged if taken by 
itself, but from the proposition at issue joined to that whole group of theories; if the predicted phenomenon 
is not produced, not only is the proposition questioned at fault, but so is the whole theoretical scaffolding 
used by the physicist. The only thing the experiment teaches us is that among the proposition used to pre-
dict the phenomenon and to establish whether it would be produced, there is at least one error; but where 
this error lies is just what it does not tell us. The physicist may declare that this error is contained in exactly 
the proposition he wishes to refute, but is he sure it is not in another proposition?”16 And Duhem concludes 
(1954: 187. French, 1906: 307): “In sum, the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental 
test, but only a whole group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in disagreement with his prediction, what 
13 In fact, for Whewell the hypothesis testing is already included in the induction itself, for example, when he asserts that “in the 
task of induction, we employ clear ideas, rigorous reasoning, and close and fair comparison of the results of the hypothesis with 
the facts. These are, no doubt, important and fundamental conditions of a just induction.” (Part Two, Book XII, Chapter XIII, p. 288)
14 Now, there are many examples against. For example, as I say in Rivadulla (2004: 95), sometimes, from a new theory, questions are 
raised, that the old theory should respond satisfactorily, if it pretends to be true, but it can not solve; in these situations the old 
theory is empirically refuted. This is the case of tests that refute MN –the advance of Mercury perihelion and the deviation of light 
by the Sun– that nevertheless confirm TGR, and new tests: gravitational redshift and gravitational waves, also surpassed by TGR, but 
absolutely unsuspected from the point of view of MN.
15 Hereafter ‘French’ means the original edition of Duhem’s book.
16 The word refute is not an interpretation of the English translator. It appears in the French original: “Le physician declare-t-il que 
cetter erreur est précisément contenue dans la proposition qu’il voulait réfuter et non pas ailleurs?”
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he learns is that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and ought to be mod-
ified; but the experiment does not designate which one should be changed.” It is not surprising, then, that in 
Section 3 of Chapter VI Duhem states that “A ‘Crucial Experiment’ is impossible in Physics”, precisely against the 
author of the Novum Organum.
5. Popper’s role in the development of the contemporary theory of scientific explanation
For two thousand and four hundred years, since Plato and Aristotle, the scientific philosophical thought of the 
West has largely focused on the concept of causation: what does it mean to say that something is the cause of 
something, and, above all, whether the causes of observed phenomena are capable of being known. The great 
contribution of the twentieth century philosophy of science was to make explicit the form of the argument 
of scientific explanations. Popper’s contribution to this work was decisive. Popper (1959: §12) claimed indeed 
that “To give a causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement which describes it, using as prem-
ises of the deduction one or more universal laws, together with certain singular statements, the initial condi-
tions.” And he adds (1959: 61) that “The ‘principle of causality’ is the assertion that any event whatsoever can 
be causally explained –that it can be deductively predicted.”17 Since, according to Popper, “It is from universal 
statements in conjunction with initial conditions that we deduce the singular statement”, Popper (1979 § 11, p. 
86, note *2) obviously anticipated Hempel’s D-N model of scientific explanation and Hempel (1965: 337, note 
2) himself acknowledged it reluctantly.
However, that scientific explanation takes the form of a deductive argument has a long tradition in the 
Western philosophy of science. We can go back, of course, to Aristotle. But it is John Stuart Mill, who, in the 
nineteenth century, truly intuited the modern form of the argument of any scientific explanation. Indeed, as he 
stated in Chapter XVI, § 1 “Of Empirical Laws,” p. 339: “The ascertainment of the empirical laws of phenomena 
often precedes by a long interval the explanation of those laws by the Deductive Method; and the verification 
of a deduction usually consists in the comparison of its results with empirical laws previously ascertained.” 
Or as he claimed two pages later: “all results obtained by the Method of Agreement (and therefore almost 
all truths obtained by simple observation without experiment) must be considered, until either confirmed by 
the Method of Difference or explained deductively, …, accounted for à priori.” It is interesting to note, first, 
the importance Mill grants to the deductive method, and secondly that Popper himself, in his Intellectual Auto-
biography, acknowledges that Mill had already anticipated his model of scientific explanation: “In section 12 of 
Logik der Forschung I discussed what I called ‘causal explanation’, or deductive explanation, a discussion which 
had been anticipated, without my being aware of it, by J. S. Mill, though perhaps a bit vaguely (because of his 
lack of distinction between an initial condition and a universal law)” (Popper 1974a: 93)
John Stuart Mill agrees with John Herschel both in the existence in science of empirical laws and in the 
necessity that such empirical laws receive a scientific explanation. Indeed, in Chapter XVI. Of empirical Laws, 
§1, Mill manifests himself in this respect as follows: “Scientific inquirers give the name of Empirical Laws to 
those uniformities which observation or experiment has shown to exist, but on which they hesitate to rely 
in cases varying much from those which have been actually observed, for want of seeing any reason why such 
a law should exist. It is implied, therefore, in the notion of an empirical law, that it is not an ultimate law; that 
if true at all, its truth is capable of being, and requires to be accounted for. It is a derivative law, the derivation 
of which is not yet known. To state the explanation, the why, of the empirical law, would be to state the laws 
from which it is derived; the ultimate causes on which it is contingent…
17 And in note 1* of this section Popper (1959: 61) clarifies years later: “I feel that I should say here more explicitly that the decision 
to search for causal explanation is that by which the theoretician adopts his aim –or the aim of theoretical science. His aim is to 
find explanatory theories (if possible, true explanatory theories); that is to say, theories which describe certain structural properties 
of the world, and which permit us to deduce, with the help of initial conditions, the effects to be explained. (…) I therefore wish to 
make it quite clear that I consider the theorist’s interest in explanation –that is, in discovering explanatory theories– as irreducible 
to the practical technological interest in the deduction of predictions.”
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The periodical return of eclipses, as originally ascertained by the persevering observation of the early 
Eastern astronomers, was an empirical law until the general law of the celestial motions had accounted for 
it.” (p. 338) Obviously: “it is the very meaning of an empirical law that we do not know the ultimate laws of 
causation on which it is dependent.” (p. 341)
And in a form that seems to anticipate the idea of initial conditions, Mill explains: “To deduce the laws 
of the heavenly motions, we require not only to know the law of a rectilineal and that of a gravitative force, 
but the existence of both theses forces in the celestial regions, and even their relative amount. The complex 
laws of causation are thus resolved into two distinct kinds of elements: the one, simpler laws of causation, 
the other (in the aptly selected expression of Dr. Chalmers) collocations; the collocations consisting in the 
existence of certain agents or powers, in certain circumstances of place and time.” (p. 306)
Wesley C. Salmon (1984: 21, note 4) thinks about Popper’s anticipation of the DN model that “Although 
Popper’s Logik der Forschung (1935) contains an important anticipation of the D-N model, it does not provide 
as precise an analysis as was embodied in (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948). Moreover, Popper’s views on sci-
entific explanation were not widely influential until the English translation (Popper, 1959) of his 1935 book 
appeared. It is for these reasons that I chose 1948, rather than 1935, as the critical point of division between 
the history and the prehistory of the subject.” This seems reasonable. But what is indisputable is that Pop-
per has already advanced very clearly to the Hempel-Openheimer model of scientific explanation and that 
even Popper had the decency to recognize that this model was already in germ at Mill. (This naturally has a 
second reading not so favourable for Popper: his criticisms of the supposed naive Millian inductivism are not 
supported if Popper himself has to acknowledge the importance of deductive reasoning in Mill’s methodology 
of science.)
6. Was Popper in his early days a realist philosopher of science?
The term realism –in a form we might call ontological– appears in opposition to idealism in Beiden Grundprob-
leme, p. 73 and again on pp. 437-438 (Zusammenfassender Auszug, IX), where Popper presents six theses of 
a so-called methodological realism. Popper concludes this section IX with the statement that the thesis that 
there are laws of Nature is epistemologically equivalent to realism. These laws of Nature or regularities is what 
we should look for if we want to know, maintains Popper in Two Fundamental Problems §10. This makes one 
suspect that scientific realism has certainly been present in Popper’s thinking ever since.
However the term realism never appears in LSD: neither in the main text nor in the appendices. None-
theless we may find serious glimpses of an underlying realistic position, e.g. in Chapter III: Theories, where 
literally Popper (1959: 59) states that “Theories are nets cast to catch what we call ‘the world’: to rationalize, 
to explain, and to master it. We endeavor to make the mesh ever finer and finer.” An of course in LSD § 85: 
The Path of Science, where Popper (1959: 278) claims that “the striving for knowledge and the search for 
truth are still the stronger motives of scientific discovery”18. Well known is Popper’s recognition of Tarski’s 
correspondence theory of truth in Sections 20 and 32 of his Intellectual Autobiography.19
In any case, a fully fledged scientific realism had already been defended by Claude Bernard, seventy 
years before Popper: “Men of science learn every day from experience; by experience they constantly correct 
their scientific ideas, their theories; rectify them, bring them into harmony with more and more facts, and so 
come nearer and nearer to the truth.” (Bernard 1957:12) Or as he says later: “The experimental method is 
concerned only with the search for objective truths.” (p. 28) And also: “Experimental reasoning is the only 
reasoning that naturalists and physicians can use in seeking the truth and approaching it as nearly as possible.” 
(p. 31) (Is not the quest for objective truth the regulatory idea of scientific practice for Popper?) We might 
almost dare to say that Bernard is ahead of Poincaré in what, since the late twentieth century came to be 
18 In German this was expressed in a slightly different way: “so ist doch das intellektuelle Streben, der Wahrheitsantrieb, wohl der 
stärskte Antreib der Forschung” (“The intellectual striving, the drive to truth, is the most powerful impulse of research”)
19 In his contribution to this volume, Luis Fernández Moreno criticises Popper’s claim that Tarski has rehabilitated the theory of 
truth as correspondence and the notion of absolute truth.
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known as structural realism: “In teaching man, experimental science results in lessening his pride more and 
more by proving to him every day that primary causes, like the objective reality of things, will be hidden from 
him forever and that he can know only relations. Here is, indeed, the one goal of all the sciences.” (p. 28. My 
italics) A structural realism which, in any case, is not dogmatic but conjectural or fallible and falsifiable in the 
purest sense sustained many decades later by Popper: “we must relieve in science, i. e.., in determinism; we 
must relieve in a complete and necessary relation between things,…; but at the same time we must be thor-
oughly convinced that we know this relation only in a more or less approximate way, and that the theories 
we hold are far from embodying changeless truths. When we propound a general theory in our sciences, we are 
sure only that, literally speaking, all such theories are false.20 They are only partial and provisional truths which are 
necessary to us, as steps on which we rest, so as to go on with investigation; they embody only the present 
state of our knowledge, and consequently they must change with the growth of science.” (pp. 35-36)
And here is the central idea of Claude Bernard’s critical scientific realism: “if we mean to find truth, 
we can solidly settle our ideas only by trying to destroy our own conclusions by counter-experiments.” (56) 
“with the help of reasoning and of experiment [experimenters] try to connect natural phenomena … with 
their immediate causes.” (p. 57)
7. Where does the idea of instrumentalism come from in the current philosophy of science?
The term instrumentalism certainly is conspicuous by its absence in Beiden Grundprobleme. A strong positivism 
is criticized in § 8 and pp. 323-324 and 378-37 and also the pragmatism, in p. 155, but without identifying any 
authors. The same occurs on pp. 324-325.
In LSD § 4 Popper identifies some ‘older positivists’, but in general he understands positivism in the form 
of neo-positivism, as for example in the second paragraph of § 9 and in §10 and §73 “Heisenberg’s Programme 
and the Uncertainty Relations”, and note *4 of §78.
Regarding instrumentalism, however, it is interesting that in a note following the publication of LF, note 
* 1, p. 59, of Chapter III: Theories, Popper claims to have designated as Instrumentalism the view represented 
in Vienna by Mach, Wittgenstein and Schlick, namely: “the view that a theory is nothing but a tool or an instru-
ment for prediction” and he states that he analyzed and criticized this point of view in his articles of 1953 
and 1956 compiled in Conjectures and Refutations of 1963. And in note * 4, p. 36, from Section 4: The Problem 
of Demarcation of LSD he claims that the instrumentalist tradition can be traced back to Berkeley, and further.
In other words, it is far from impossible that it was precisely Popper who introduced the name and 
concept of instrumentalism in the current philosophy of science.21
8. Conclusion
I think it is not unfair to affirm that the information that Popper accredits of contemporary European phi-
losophers of science and of philosophically relevant contemporary scientists is very scarce. Popper seems to 
ignore of the philosophy of the science of his time more than he credits to know.
What would have been of Popper’s epistemology and of the philosophy of science in general if Sir Karl 
had been aware of Claude Bernard’s scientific methodology? Indeed, Popper was unaware of the existence of 
the French epistemologist. But already seventy years before him, Bernard had developed: 1. A perfectly argued 
theory of critical realism; 2. A view on the theory-load of the observational base; 3. A theory of induction 
with suggestive relations to abduction –naturally, for obvious reasons, not known as such by Bernard– and a 
vindication of the context of scientific discovery; and 4. A falsificationist methodology of empirical science that 
Popper himself could have made perfectly his own.
20 This is very interesting indeed. Is not this the idea underlying the comparison of theories by their verisimilitude in the Popperian 
methodology of science?
21 I suggest this idea in Rivadulla (2015: Chap. VI, § 3.)
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What could have been and was not also applies in relation to the Austro-Hungarian doctor Ignaz 
Semmelweiss (1818-1865). Semmelweiss worked as an obstetrics assistant at the Vienna General Hospital 
between 1845 and 1855, when he returned to Budapest to take up the obstetrics chair at the university. 
Semmelweis’s discovery during his stay in Vienna that puerperal fever was produced by the lack of hygiene of 
the gynaecologists is widely recognized by contemporary philosophers of science as an excellent example of 
abductive inference. Popper could have heard of him.
All the bibliography Popper mentions in The Fundamental Problems is in German. Even the one originally 
published in English is quoted from translations into German. In any case, this does not excuse him from call-
ing ingenuous or radical inductivists to Bacon and Mill. In addition, the great question remains: What would 
have been of his anti-inductivism if he had known Fisher’s inductive conception of the theory of inferential 
statistics? In any case, an important part of the problem of induction had already been solved by the British 
philosophers of the nineteenth century, almost a hundred years before Popper had offered his own proposal. 
Could not even Popper’s anti-inductivism be described as radical or even naive? Not to mention that his later 
attempts to prove the impossibility of inductive probability failed disastrously (Cf. Rivadulla 1987 and 1994).
As far as the refutationist or falsificationist methodology of science is concerned, what made Popper 
produce a breakthrough in the philosophy of science was the emphasis he placed on that science must con-
sciously seek the refutation of tentative hypotheses, that the scientific method is that of conjectures and 
refutations. But this methodology was already completely familiar both in insular and continental Europe for 
scientists like Bernard, Herschel, Jevons, Whewell, Stuart Mill and Pierre Duhem.
In any case, neither of these names is mentioned in Carnap’s Logical Structure of the World, although Mill 
and Duhem are among the aforementioned authors who were read and discussed by the members of the 
Vienna Circle. Should we then excuse Popper by his ignorance of all the falsificationist philosophy of science 
that had preceded him?
It is unquestionable that Popper clearly advanced Hempel-Openheimer’s model of scientific explana-
tion. Now, as we have seen in Section 5, Popper himself acknowledged that the modern form of deductive 
explanation, before him, had already been anticipated by Stuart Mill. Thus Popper’s criticisms of Mill’s supposed 
naive inductivism are unjustified as Popper himself should have recognized the importance of the deductive 
reasoning in Mill’s methodology of science.
Finally, I leave the readers of this article to personally decide on the lights and shadows that exist in the 
origins of the Popperian philosophy of science. 
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